Rite Aid Collective Bargaining Agreement

A presumption of arbiter capacity applies to all contracts with a broad arbitration clause. AT T Techs., 475 U.S. to 650; Trap Rock Indus., 982 F.2d at 888 n. 5. The broad clauses contain an included language, such as provisions that require that „all differences in the interpretation of the contract“ be subject to arbitration. AT T Techs., 475 U.S. to 650; See also z.B. United Steel Workers Int`l Union v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 549 F.

Supp. 2d 585, 590 (D. Del. 2008). Such clauses require that all disputes concerning the CBA be referred to an arbitrator, unless the contract expressly clears the dispute or the party wishing to avoid arbitration provides other „imperative evidence of an exclusionary purpose“. AT T Techs., 475 U.S. to 650 (citation Warrior Gulf, 363 U.S. at 484-85); Rohm Haas Co., 522 F.3d to 331. On the other hand, tight arbitration clauses – such as those that limit arbitration to a few discrete types of litigation – have no presumption of arbitration. See Int`l Bhd. of Elec.

Workers v. Verizon N.J., Inc., 458 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 2006). The arbitration provision at issue, which imposes arbitration, unless a dispute „does not involve any interpretation“ of the agreements, is broad. (doc. 16, No. 11.4.) See z.B. E.M. Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Local 169, Int`l Bhd. of Teamsters, 812 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir.

1987) (concluded that a compromise clause that includes „any alleged dispute resulting from a violation of this agreement“ is broad); Armco Indep Butler. Union v. Armco, Inc., 701 F.2d 253, 256-57 (3d Cir. 1983) (even with respect to a clause granting the arbitrator „the power to interpret and apply the provisions of this agreement only to the extent necessary to establish a remedy“ (modification of the original); compare Verizon N.J., 458 F.3d to 311 (to the conclusion that an arbitration clause was narrow , because it explicitly delineated the disputes that had been the subject of arbitration). In all disputes that have a contractual clause, there is therefore a presumption of simplicity. Notwithstanding this presumption, arbitration proceedings are not required for litigation that is not related to a validity period of cee. Rohm Haas, 522 F.3d to 332. Numerous other sources confirm that unions are characteristically negotiating access to an employer`s property for the purposes of union organization. See z.B. NLRB v. Local 348-S, United Food Commercial Workers Int`l Union, 273 F. App`x 40, 41 (2d Cir.

2008) (documents that the union was negotiating a neutrality agreement by the employer that included the right to enter the employer`s premises); Hotel employees. Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., 299 F. Supp. 2d 461, 465 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (equal); William John Bux Miranda Tolar, Houston Janitors the Evolution of Union Organizing, 70 TEX. B.J. 426, 427-28 (2007) (taking into account the fact that employers generally ratify neutrality agreements – which often involve a right of access to employer property – in response to union pressure, in accordance with the bargaining process); Larry W. Bridgesmith John E.B Gerth, The Summer of Union Discontent Portends a Season of Employer Discomfort, 39 J. HEALTH L. 117, 130-32 (2006) (same); Adrienne E.

Eaton Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing under Neutrality Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 42, 47 (2001) (review of 132 negotiated neutrality agreements, finding that about two-thirds of them contained clauses allowing unions to access employer property for the purposes of union organization).